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In this chapter I address the question of why the role of religious arguments should
be limited asmuchas exclusionists and inclusionists suggest. For proponents of pub-
lic reason, participants are supposed to exercise self-restraint with respect to reli-
gious arguments, and everyone who fails to do so is considered to fail as a citizen –
these are considerable burdens on participants in public discourse, and they need
to be justiϐied.
Public reason theories, though, hardly ever address this issue explicitly, and
where they do they do not provide much detail. One can distinguish ϐive arguments
in the public reason literature that have been offered as rationales for self-restraint:
the consensus demand, the argument that religious arguments are special, the prin-
ciple of the separation of church and state, the argument from respect, and the argu-
ment from coercion. I argue that the ϐirst four arguments fail to provide an adequate
basis for restraint. The ϐifth, the argument from coercion, has the greatest potential
to provide a rationale for self-restraint, if it is combined with the argument from
respect.
The argument from coercion is based on the idea that coercion needs to be jus-
tiϐied. On this account the need for a concept of public reason derives from the need
to justify coercive political arrangements. Proponents of this argument hold that
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citizens should be able to understand the reasons for the coercive political arrange-
ments towhich they are subject. In order to understand the reasons for coercion, the
arguments offered in public discourse in support of political arrangements need to
be accessible to all citizens. Therefore, citizens should refrain from using arguments
that they cannot reasonably expect other citizens to accept, religious arguments in
particular.
͡.͠ Consensus
It is tempting to see public reason as a tool, as it were, for bringing about consensus
between citizens on the basic institutions and rules of society. Public reason would
then be justiϐied as ameans of taming pluralism for the purpose of reaching political
agreements. By limiting the range of legitimate arguments in public discourse to ac-
cessible arguments, public reason so understood could provide a basis of agreement
and understanding for discussing, and ultimately solving, at least the most funda-
mental issues of the political order.
It has been noted that both traditional andmodernWestern philosophy affords a
central place to consensus.͟ In public reason liberalism, too, the notion of consensus
has been the subject of extensive debate. There has been a discussion between con-
sensus views (Postema ͧͧͣ͟) as opposed to convergence views of public discourse
(D’Agostino ͧͧͤ͟; Gaus ͧͧͥ͟). According to the consensus view, public discussion
should result in mutual understanding and agreement on a policy proposal for the
same reasons; that is, citizens should share reasons for political arrangements. Pro-
ponents of the convergence view, by contrast, argue that this is an unachievable re-
quirement, holding instead that convergence is sufϐicient; that is, it is enough for
citizens to endorse a political arrangement for their own reasons. The central ques-
tion of this discussion is whether agreement on a political arrangement requires
only agreement on the desirability or form of the arrangement itself, or additional
agreement on the reasons or justiϐications for the arrangement.
While this debate between convergence and consensus is not concerned to
provide a rationale for the concept of public reason, it does point out that consensus
on political arrangements does not require consensus on reasons for political ar-
rangements. Religious citizens can, for example, support an environment protection
plan for reasons related to Biblical stewardship, while secular citizens may support
the plan because they believe that the protection of the environment as the basis
͟ For this point and a critique of consensualism see Rescher ͧͧ͟͡.
ͣ͞
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of human life is a duty of present generations towards future generations. In this
way, different reasons converge on the same political arrangement, and consensus
is possible – on the level of arrangements if not on the level of arguments.
A simple consensus on arrangements need not be less stable than a double con-
sensus on arrangements and arguments. In a simple consensus, citizens support an
arrangement for reasons which seem to them the most convincing and acceptable,
and which ϐit their moral and political views. Such principled support may even be
more likely to be stable than a negotiated consensus brought about by an effort of
persuasion. It is possible that reasons fail to converge, of course. In the absence of
convergence, a principled agreement may not be possible, but acquiescence (Res-
cher ͧͧ͟͡) or a principled consensus on the fairness of political procedures may
serve just as well.
If a consensus on political arrangements does not require a consensus on reas-
ons, then this militates against the need for consensus as a rationale for public
reason. Moreover, public reason is not sufϐicient for achieving consensus, as has
been argued in relation to Rawls’s famous “abortion footnote”. In a footnote on the
question of abortion, Rawls suggests that any regulation which denies the right to
abortion in the ϐirst trimester would go against the ideal of public reason (Rawls
ͧͧͤ͟, p. ͢͠͡f., n. ͡͠). Rawls has been criticised for this note on the basis that public
reason alone does not lead to this conclusion (Quinn ͧͧͣ͟, p. ͢͡). Public reason is
not conclusive, that is, it does not offer substantial solutions to contentious polit-
ical issues. As Rawls later clariϐied, though, it had not been his intention to suggest
that public reason could provide one deϐinitive solution to contentious substantial
problems. The footnote, Rawls said, expressed his opinion but was not supposed
to provide an argument for the right to abortion in the ϐirst trimester (Rawls ͧͧͥ͟,
p. ͥͧͦ, n. ͦ͞). Even if they are discussed exclusively in terms of public reason, the
arguments included in this set are still too diverse to point to one single conclusion.
In the case of abortion, the right of women to decide over their own bodies and the
right the foetus as human being has to life are two reasons which fall within the
purview of public reason, but which point to opposite conclusions about a right to
abortion. Unanimity, Rawls conϐirms, is not to be expected (ibid., p. ͥͧͦ).
Rather than consensus, public reason is intimately connected to legitimacy ac-
cording to Rawls’s account (Rawls ͧͧͤ͟, p. ͤ͟͡). Rawls holds that if all citizens and
government ofϐicials observe the duty of civility, that is if they do not use any ar-
guments that depend on their comprehensive doctrines, then the law that has been
decided by a majority is legitimate law (Rawls ͧͧͥ͟, p. ͥͥ͞). This is a speciϐication
of his principle that political power should only be used in ways which all citizens
can reasonably be expected to understand and endorse (Rawls ͧͧͤ͟, p. ͥ͟͡).
ͣ͟
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Rawls does embrace a kind of consensus as a requirement for political stabil-
ity. This is expressed in his notion of overlapping consensus. The basic political ar-
rangements of society, which correspond to a freestanding political conception of
justice, should be embraced by citizens from their own perspectives, i.e., for reasons
deriving from their comprehensive doctrines. Thus the shared political conception
of justice is a module that ϐits into every reasonable, comprehensive doctrine. The
result is the overlapping consensus, a consensus on a political conception of justice
endorsed by each citizen from his own particular point of view.
In Rawls’s account the overlapping consensus guarantees stability because it is a
consensus which citizens embrace for their own, principled reasons (not because of
pragmatic considerations, as in amodus vivendi) andwhich is supportedby each cit-
izen’s comprehensive doctrine.͠ The object of the overlapping consensus, a political
conception of justice, also provides the nature and content of public reason (ibid.,
p. ͟͠͡). Public reason is therefore not a prerequisite for the overlapping consensus;
both are shaped by a political conception of justice.
In sum, public reason is neither necessary nor sufϐicient for achieving consensus,
and the argument from consensus can therefore not serve as a rationale for self-
restraint in the use of religious arguments in public discourse.
͡.͡ The problematic nature of religious arguments
Robert Audi defends an approach to public discourse in which the need to exclude
religious arguments from public discourse does not derive primarily from the prin-
ciple of public reason, but from the particular features of religious arguments (Audi
ͧͧ͟͡, p. ͤͧ͞f.). Audi offers a list of eight points describing what he regards as par-
ticularly problematic aspects of religious arguments (Audi ͠͞͞͞, p. ͟͞͞-͡):
• First, under the heading “infallible supreme authority”, Audi claims that be-
lievers often take religious arguments to represent an infallible authority and
believe they must be true.
• Second, believers have “condemnatory tendencies”: they tend to believe that
those who do not share their religious belief are damned or in other ways
fundamentally deϐicient.
͠ JohnHorton has remarked that in some cases amodus vivendimay even be able to generate stronger
acceptance than an overlapping consensus precisely because the former does not require principled
agreement and does not elevate contentious issues to the level of principled disagreement (Horton
͠͞͞͡, p. ͠͞).
ͣ͠
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• Third, there is a threat of religiousdominationbecause religious reasons tend
to dictate religious practices or practices which are religious in intent. In
some cases, therefore, religious arguments force others to observe a religious
standard. This can be called religious coercion.
• Fourth, many religions accord a position of power to their clergy which
makes it possible for clergy to interpret religious sources according to their
personal views and preferences. As there seem to be no effective checks on
these tendencies, it is possible that those who follow the clergy’s belief do
not act with the autonomy required of citizens in a liberal democracy.
• Fifth, religious believers are subject to “dangers of an inϐlated sense of self-
importance”, and the wish of religions, religious people, and religious groups
to dominate others. Religious believers can be zealotswho are uncooperative
as citizens. This kind of zeal is capable of eroding citizenship.
• Sixth, religious believers often display a passionate concern with outsiders
and,more often than non-believing citizens, are stubbornly passionate about
the importance of their faith and the need for everyone to act according to it,
be it in public or private.
• Seventh, religious liberty is a constitutive foundation of liberal democracy
and citizens resent religious coercion more than they resent coercion on
other grounds, such as public health. If coercion is asymmetrically based on
religious as opposed to secular considerations, the danger exists of a clash of
Gods competing for social control. This can result in destruction and death.
• Finally, religious believers tend more than others to want to inculcate their
children with their own faith. Often they feel betrayed if their children reject
their faith.
It is noticeable that this list does not primarily concern features of religious argu-
ments, but features of religious persons. Audi paints a rather bleak picture of the
tendencies of religious persons as citizens, characterising them as self-important,
judgemental, and dogmatic. These are not faults of religious arguments or even re-
ligious doctrines, but faults common to religious citizens, or so Audi claims. A re-
ligious citizen, according to Audi, condemns everyone who does not adhere to his
faith; believes in the absolute truth of religious teachings and unquestioningly ac-
cepts religious authority; and is adamant about the prime importance that everyone,
including his own children as well as other citizens, follows his faith.
At the same time, Audi is very optimistic about the prospects of persuading be-
lievers that they should exercise self-restraintwhendealingwith their own religious
ͣ͡
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beliefs. He asks the reader to suppose he is a citizen who wants to advocate man-
datory prayer or meditation in state schools. He has only religious reasons for his
advocacy but is not initially disturbed by that.
But if, for example, I imagine being forced to observe certain dietary laws or to dress in a certain
style because another religion gains a majority and makes this legally binding, I may begin to
see the advantages of adhering to the principle of secular rationale in matters of coercive law
or public policy. I would feel alienated if coerced through the majority vote of another religious
group acting as such. My sense of fairness will tend to restrain me from doing likewise (Audi
͠͞͞͞, p. ͦͥ).
The image of the religious citizen presented here differs markedly from the previ-
ous one. In this latter quote, a religious citizen distinguishes between secular and
religious arguments and the role they play in his embracing certain political stand-
points; he is sensitive to his fellow citizens’ not sharing his religious belief. Far from
taking this as evidence of the need to impose his faith on them, this religious citizen
respects his fellow citizens’ lack or difference of belief and adjusts his own political
behaviour so as not to act on a religious basis they could not understand. This reli-
gious citizen is capable of counterfactual reasoning and is concerned primarily not
with salvation, but with political justice (at least in his political dealings).
The two images of the religious citizen are difϐicult to reconcile. It is hard to
see how a citizen who believes that his arguments represent some infallible higher
authority, who tends to condemn non-believing citizens and who has a religiously
grounded, inϐlated sense of self-importance, would say to himself that it would be
morally wrong to present religious arguments in public discussion. Self-restraint
presupposes that a citizen can distance himself from his views, religious or other-
wise; what Audi thinks is characteristic of religious believers is precisely the inabil-
ity (or unwillingness) of believers to step back from their religious commitments.
It seems that Audi had in mind some kind of negative stereotype of the conser-
vative anti-abortion, anti-homosexuality fundamentalist when drawing up his list
of religious features. Religious citizens like that undoubtedly exist, but when testing
intuitions about religious arguments it is useful to try another example of a religious
citizen. Imagine a religious citizen who is, say, a protestant believer, and who pas-
sionately believes that the core of religious belief is that God has created all human
beings in His image and hence as equals. On this basis he believes with absolute
certainty that God has willed homosexuality to exist and that same-sex marriage
should therefore be allowed. This citizen believes that this view must be true be-
cause it stems fromGod,whomhebelieves to be the infallible, supreme authority. He
believes that everyone who condemns homosexuality in some signiϐicant way falls
ͣ͢
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short of what can be expected from a human being. He thinks that citizens should be
coerced into treating homosexuals as equals, and so on. It is doubtful not only that
Audiwould still want to claim that this person is fundamentally deϐicient as a citizen,
but that he could still claim as a reason that this citizen is a religious citizen. That is
to say, for Audi religion does not seem to be the problem: the problem is certain atti-
tudes, such as intransigence, arrogance, and dogmatism, which particular believers
may possess, but need not.
There could be an argument why democracy would fare better without every
personal attribute Audi names (with the possible exception of the eight point, which
concerns passing one’s faith on to one’s children). They imply that citizens should
be tolerant and respectful to people who hold a different opinion, critical of citizens
who claim infallible authority, and generally modest and cooperative. Certainly a
citizen who has all these virtues is a very good citizen indeed. Yet he would be a
good citizen neither because of his religion nor despite it, but independently not
only of his religious commitments, but also of his using religious arguments.
Maybe what Audi wants to say is not that there is an inherent relationship
between religion and certain character traits which are undesirable in citizens, but
that these character traits can be found most frequently among religious people.
Evidence for such a reading is the frequency with which Audi claims that religious
people “often” are such and such or “tend to” do such and such. Audi must think that
the empirical connection is quite strong, otherwise he would not have cared to set
it down in his eight points.
Audi does not provide empirical evidence for his claims, and research in the em-
pirical psychology of religion does not corroborate the relationship between reli-
gion and personality traits that are generally deemed undesirable (e.g. Argyle and
Beit-Hallahmi ͧͥͣ͟). Surveys have found religious people to be on average more
submissive, more sober, more conforming, more tender-minded, and more self-
disciplined than others (Francis and Bourke ͠͞͞͡). I am not aware of any research
into the relationship between religion and intransigence, or religion and an inϐlated
sense of self-importance, but the research results mentioned make it unlikely that
religious belief is connected to any of these features. There is evidence, therefore,
that Audi’s empirical claim is not tenable. Not only do non-religious citizens display
the same “vices” as Audi associates with religious citizens; religious citizens often
fail to conform to Audi’s view of them – just think of those Catholics who criticise
the Pope’s position on abortion, birth control, homosexuality, or female priests.
Moreover, it is not always clear why the traits Audi relates to religious belief
should be detrimental to liberal democracy. For example, zeal need not erode cit-
ͣͣ
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izenship but may very well strengthen it. Some passion for one’s political and other
commitments can be rather beneϐicial to democracy. Citizens who are passionate
about their commitments are often also more active in public life. In times when a
general apathy among citizens is bemoaned, there is reason for democrats to be glad
about those citizens whose political commitments are strengthened by religious or
ethical commitments.
Most importantly, however, Audi’s list of negative personality traits correlating
with religious belief cannot serve as grounds to restrain the use of religious argu-
ments, precisely because the list concerns personality traits. A moral obligation not
to use religious arguments, even if it were to be accepted by religious citizens, would
have no effect on their personal traits and therefore on their civic virtue. Theywould
not use religious arguments, but theywould still be just as intransigent and still have
just as inϐlated a sense of self-importance as before.
One of themost common arguments against the use of religious arguments – the
alleged effect they have of causing conϐlict and war – is not an independent point in
Audi’s list. It is mentioned under the centrality of religious liberty, in drastic formu-
lations: where Gods vie for social control, destruction and death is not far off (Audi
͠͞͞͞, p. ͟͞͡). At other points in the argument, Audi expands on this claim. He claims
that “all polarization is prima facie bad” and that religious polarisation is “uniquely
serious” (ibid., p. ͥ͟͢). Audi gives no evidence for this claim; probably he had inmind
contemporary conϐlicts like those in the Balkans or Northern Ireland, and historical
instances of religious violence such as the crusades or religious persecution such as
that during the inquisition. Underlying all this is the assumption that religion has
a unique potential to polarise, which can lead to charged political conϐlicts, social
polarisation and ultimately violent strife.
The claim about the polarising potential of religion is best understood as an
empirical claim about the likelihood of religious conϐlict in the wake of debates in
which religious arguments are used. Some remarks about the plausibility of this
claim are in order. First, there is a difference between a religious conϐlict and a
conϐlict between religious groups. Conϐlicts about non-religious issues (such as re-
sources or sovereignty over territory) may be structured along religious cleavages
but this does not necessarily entail that religious arguments play a role. Second,
given that so many people throughout the world are religious, and given the fea-
tures Audi ascribes to a signiϐicant number of religious people, it comes as a sur-
prise that there are not more religious conϐlicts. Religious conϐlicts have for a long
time been mostly absent from most of Western Europe, for example, even though
many religious people still live there who, moreover, do not exercise self-restraint
with respect to religious arguments. Third, there is no empirical evidence that reli-
ͣͤ
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gious ideologies are more dangerous than non-religious belief. One need not draw
on drastic examples like National Socialism, Stalin’s regime or the Khmer to argue
that divisiveness and the endangerment of peace is not the monopoly of religion.͡
Fourth, the difference between polarisation as such and violent conϐlict is crucial to
liberal democracy: polarisation cannot be prevented, and should not be prevented
since it is, at least to a certain extent, a normal element of politics and a consequence
of pluralism. Politics is about managing disagreement, and disagreement can take
the form of polarisation without any detrimental effect on the polity. The argument
as Audi presents it is too strong: polarisation has been known to occur without the
involvement of religious arguments, and polarisation has failed to occur on occa-
sions when religious arguments were exchanged.
While these arguments caution against relating religious arguments to violent
conϐlict, let us assume for the sake of discussion that Audi is correct in his claim that
allowing religious arguments in public discourse will increase the risk of conϐlict by
raising the stakes in political disagreement. Even then it is not clear how this argu-
ment, pragmatic as it is, could support the political-philosophical notion of public
reason. All it can lead to is the claim that if the circumstances of a given polity are
such that the use of religious arguments is likely to lead to religious conϐlict, it would
be better for citizens not to use them. This could then be presented not as a prin-
cipled requirement of citizens’ virtue, but as an imperative of political expedience.
However, where religious arguments are likely to lead to religious conϐlict, volun-
tary self-restraint by religious citizens is even less likely than in situations where
religion’s potential to cause conϐlict is low. As a pragmatic argument, the claim that
religious arguments are particularly dangerous may not be wrong (depending on
the circumstances), but it cannot serve as a ground for a general principle of self-
restraint.
͡.͢ The separation of church and state
Audi has offered another rationale for public reason. In the paper The Separation of
Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship (Audi ͧͦͧ͟), he claims that the
principle of the separation of church and state can serve as the basis of the need for
a notion of public reason.͢
͡ See also the argument to this effect in Wolterstorff ͧͧͥ͟a, p. ͥͧ.
͢ This argument returns in Audi’s most recent book (Audi ͠͞͞͞, ch. ͠) but his argument remains the
same. For a discussion of Audi’s principle of separation with a different thrust than the present ar-
gument, see Greenawalt ͧͧͣ͟, ch. ͤ.
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The principle of the separation of church and state, which Audi calls the sep-
aration doctrine, stipulates that the state should not establish a church or impair
religious liberty (Audi ͧͦͧ͟, p. ͤ͠͞). This principle applies to what the state can
legitimately do in relation to churches and individual believers: the state may not
interfere with the practice of any religion, may not prefer one religion to another,
and may not prefer religion as such to non-belief.
Audi holds that the state shouldnot interferewith religion, but also that churches
should not interfere with government.ͣ While Audi acknowledges that there is no
legal normprohibiting churches fromacting politically, he still thinks that, to protect
religious liberty and neutrality, churches should not take a standpoint on political
issues (moral issues not included). Churches, Audi says, have a prima facie obliga-
tion not to support candidates for ofϐice and not to press for speciϐic policies, par-
ticularly if these policies are included in the platform of a particular political party
(Audi ͧͦͧ͟, p. ͥ͢͠). After laying downprinciples for the behaviour of the clergy, Audi
turns to citizens, claiming that the ideals of freedomanddemocracy that underlie the
separation of church and state also have implications for individual conduct (Audi
ͧͦͧ͟, p. ͥͦ͠). They lead to individual principles of conscience, which stipulate that
citizens should not advocate coercive political arrangements unless they have and
are motivated by adequate secular reasons.ͤ
However, it is far from clear from Audi’s account how far the norms of freedom
and democracy lead to restraints on the use of religious arguments in public. In par-
ticular, Audi does not say how the institutional principle of the separation of church
and state can be turned into two individual principles of conscience. That some ar-
gument is needed to make this step is clear from the ways Audi explicates the insti-
tutional principle of the separation of church and state. He states that the separation
doctrine stipulates that the state should not establish a church and should not give
preference to religion over atheism. Neither of these points concerns religious argu-
ments. Moreover, the establishment of a church is not amatter of citizens’ discourse,
and Audi would certainly not seek to hold that not only the state, but also individual
citizens should be indifferent to or even-handed between religion and atheism. In-
dividual citizens are free not only to hold, but also to express a preference for either
religion or atheism. Similarly, while it is debatable whether the clergy has a moral
obligation not to support candidates for ofϐice, it is clear that citizens should not be
prevented from supporting candidates for ofϐice. This shows that the principles of
ͣ Amy Gutmann has defended a similar conception of the separation of church and state which she
calls “two-way protection”. This entails that the state protects (individual) religious freedom and
that organised religion refrains from interfering in politics (Gutmann ͠͞͞͡, ch. ͢).
ͤ For an exposition of Audi’s two principles, see chapter ͠, section ͠.͡.
ͣͦ
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the separation doctrine cannot simply be imposed on individual citizens. But if dif-
ferent principles are imposed, Audi needs to show how far they can still be deduced
from the separation doctrine.
The difϐiculty here is that in liberal democracy principles applying to the state
often differ from principles applying to individual citizens. It is therefore not sur-
prising that Audi discusses the normative grounds for the separation of church and
state, referring explicitly to the state, not to citizens. Guaranteeing freedom of re-
ligious belief, freedom of worship, and freedom to engage in the rites and rituals
of one’s religion is a duty of the state, not a duty of individual citizens. The same
applies to the principles of equality and neutrality. Citizens may be expected to sup-
port these values or at least to not undermine the government’s efforts at enforcing
them, but citizens cannot ensure that all other citizens can enjoy these rights.
In his discussion Audi refers to neutrality, equality and freedom of belief as prin-
ciples of the state, and does not provide an argument for how they can be used to
turn the institutional principles of the separation between church and state into in-
dividual principles of conscience. Given the gap between the state’s duties and those
of individual citizens, it is doubtful that such an argument could be constructed in
any case.
͡.ͣ Respect
Respect is one of the central notions in the literature on public reason. It has been
argued that the concept of respect is the moral justiϐication for, or normative found-
ation of the idea of public reason.
In a defence of Rawls’s conception of public reason, James Boettcher has claimed
that respect for persons is primarily related to respecting the two basic moral
powers Rawls identiϐies: the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for the
pursuit of a conception of the good (Boettcher ͥ͠͞͞, p. ͧ͠͠). Boettcher argues that
fundamental political questions (the discussion of which should be regulated by
public reason) bear signiϐicantly on the exercise of these two powers and should
therefore be regulated by public reason. Moreover, Boettcher states that public de-
liberation is about the justiϐication of political power, and given that political power
is coercive power, citizens as co-legislators should not be prepared to exercise it
over others without giving justiϐications theymay reasonably accept (ibid., p. ͠͡͞f.).
However, this reasoning does not succeed in relating the notion of respect to the
notion of public reason, because the notion of public reason describes not only the
fact that there should be public reasoning, but the restraints that should govern it. A
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moral basis for thenotionof public reason thereforehas to answernot only theques-
tion “Why reason publicly?”, but also “Why refrain from using certain arguments
when reasoning publicly?”. Boettcher would need to show how the notion of respect
can be used to advocate a form of public discussion in which self-restraint is a lead-
ing notion. To say that public reasoning should take place is to say that arguments
should be publicly exchanged; the kind of arguments that should be exchanged is a
different question.ͥ
A moral justiϐication for the need for public reason has to explain not only why
there should be public reasoning, but also why, for example, it should not simply
consist of giving each other one’s best reasons, or reasons one expects to be par-
ticularly convincing to one’s opponents. In particular, a rationale for the concept of
public reason needs to be able to say why some arguments should not be used in
public reasoning.
A very similar account to Boettcher’s is offered by Gerald Gaus, who ϐirst offers
a number of reasons why there should be public reasoning, which emerged from
his prior discussion of the history of political liberalism (Gaus ͠͞͞͡, p. ͣ͠͞f.). Gaus
then proceeds to argue in favour of his own rationale, the liberal principle of justify-
ing interference. He argues that it is a fundamental liberal principle that there is an
asymmetry between acting and interferingwith someone else’s action. Interference
always requires justiϐication if it is to be just. This principle applies not only, as Gaus
states Rawls thinks, to state institutions but to the individual, too: “Alf’s interference
with Betty is legitimate if there exists a justiϐication for it that Betty may reasonably
be expected to endorse” (ibid., p. ͦ͠͞).
Both Gaus and Boettcher are guided by the idea that citizens exert some sig-
niϐicant kind of inϐluence over each other. Public discussions revolve around polit-
ical arrangements; all citizens of a polity are subject to these political arrangements,
and are constrained in their behaviour by them; because citizens are free and equal
agents, they all need to be able to understand the reasons for these political arrange-
ments. Therefore, citizens who respect each other as free and equal will offer each
other accessible reasons. On these accounts, the need for a concept of public reason
ultimately derives from the need to justify coercive political arrangements.
As I have argued, the principle of respect is on its own insufϐicient as grounds
ͥ Responding to Larmore’s Kantian argument about respect (see below, p. ͟͟, n. ͤ͟), Galston has put
this point nicely: “To treat an individual as a person rather than an object is to offer him an explan-
ation. Fine, but what kind of explanation? Larmore seems to suggest that a properly respectful ex-
planation must appeal to beliefs already held by one’s interlocutors; whence the need for neutral
dialogue. This seems arbitrary and implausible. I would suggest, rather, that we show others respect
when we offer them, as explanation, what we take to be our true and best reasons for acting as we
do” (Galston ͧͧ͟͟, p. ͧ͟͞; emphasis in original).
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for the concept of public reason. Its plausibility depends on a different argument, to
which the argument from coercion is attached: the argument that coercion needs to
be justiϐied.
͡.ͤ Coercion
The most convincing rationale for the need for public reason, if combined with the
argument from respect, is the idea that coercion needs to be justiϐied.
RememberAudi’s list ofwhat is problematic about religious arguments. In points
one, three and seven, Audi addresses the issueof religious coercion. Underpoint one,
infallible supreme authority, Audi says that an attitude of taking religious tenets as
representing an infallible authority also implies that damnation will be forthcom-
ing not only to the guilty, but to everyone failing to comply with the tenets of faith.
This may lead citizens to think that coercion was warranted to achieve the desired
result, by proselytising, for example (Audi ͠͞͞͞, p. ͟͟͞). Points three and seven deal
explicitly with the danger of religious coercion. They express a fear that religious
citizens may try to coerce others into observing a religious standard, and the belief
that religious coercion is more problematic than coercion based on something else,
such as public health considerations.
The argument from coercionmay be able to bridge the gap between the require-
ment that laws be justiϐied and the requirement that public justiϐication requires
self-restraint on thepart of the citizens. It couldbridge this gapbyproviding a reason
why citizens need to give only arguments which others can embrace as reasons on
which they themselveswould act. In short, it could provide an argument for the need
to exclude religious reasons from the range of public discourse, reasons which can-
not serve as reasons for everyone and are therefore unϐit for providing grounds for
coercion.
The assumption underlying the argument from coercion is that citizens have the
power and the opportunity to coerce one another, and that the self-restraint man-
dated by public reason is indicated because it is necessary for the justiϐied exercise
of coercion (which, in turn, is necessitated by the requirement of respect). The cru-
cial element in this claim, and its weakness, for which I argue in the next chapter, is
the claim that citizens exercise coercive power over one another.
The assumption that citizens exercise coercive power over one another and that
this justiϐies the imposition of public reason is to be found in accounts of public
reason of both inclusionist and exclusionist tendencies. Rawls, for instance, posits
that public reason is “the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise
ͤ͟
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ϐinal political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending
their constitution” (Rawls ͧͧͥ͟, p. ͟͢͠). Moreover, Rawls says that part of the idea
of public reason is that it applies to discussions of coercive norms (ibid., p. ͥͤͥ); he
characterises the relationship between citizens as “a relation of free and equal cit-
izens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body” (ibid., p. ͥͤͧf.).ͦ At
the same time, Rawls describes public reason as a view “about the kind of reasons
on which citizens are to rest their political cases in making their political justiϐica-
tions to one another when they support laws and policies that invoke the coercive
powers of government” (ibid., p. ͥͧͣ). There is some ambiguity here about the exact
location of the coercive element of politics: does it rest with citizens as a collective
body or with the powers of government? Perhaps Rawls should be read as meaning
both.ͧ
The ultimate political power is the power to make laws. If citizens are vested
with this power, their role in democracy is that of lawmaker. Christopher Eberle has
claimed:
In a democratic polity, citizens and legislators are lawmakers: they have some modicum of le-
gitimate control over the laws that the government is authorized to enforce by exercising its
coercive power. Further, the control that citizens and legislators exercise is fundamental: in the-
ory at least, which laws the government is authorized to enforce ultimately depend [sic] on the
decisions of the citizenry and their elected representatives (Eberle ͤ͠͞͞, p. ͥ͠͞; emphasis in
original).͟͞
As with Rawls, there is some ambiguity between locating coercive power with gov-
ernment on the one hand and with citizens on the other. It is clear, however, that
both Rawls and Eberle regard citizens as having essentially the same role in demo-
cracy as legislators, namely, that of lawmakers. Therefore, Eberle claims, the duty of
public justiϐication applies most importantly and most directly to citizens, because
of their inϐluence over laws; the role of government is to enforce the laws on which
citizens decide (Eberle ͠͞͞͠, p. ͣͣ). The state, then, is the executing power, whereas
ͦ For a discussion of Rawls’s assumption that the political is particularly coercive, see Edmundson
͠͞͞͠.
ͧ Compare Greenawalt’s stance on this issue. In an article on the justiϐication of coercion, he writes:
“This question has most often been addressed at the broadest level: what justiϐies any coercion by
government? I address a narrower question: what kinds of reasons must ofϐicials and citizens have
to support instances of political coercion?” (Greenawalt ͧͧ͟͡, p. ͣͥ͡). This could be taken to suggest
that the political activities of citizens are part of the coercive activity of government.
͟͞ Jeremy Waldron takes a similar view. He claims that “[w]e are all ofϐicials in a democracy”, because




the citizenry as a collective is the author of laws. As authors of coercive laws, citizens
authorize the state to exercise its coercive powers (ibid., p. ͣͥ).
Like Eberle, PaulWeithman regards citizenship as a social rolewhich bringswith
it certain duties for citizens when they exercise political power (Weithman ͠͞͞͠,
p. ͠). This concerns not only voting, but also advocacy:
[V]oting is an exercise of citizens’ role-speciϐic power to determine political outcomes. The im-
portance of political outcomes, and the very great interest citizens have in how political ques-
tions are decided, explains why that power should be exercised responsibly. The fact that ad-
vocacy must be engaged in responsibly can then be explained by the connections among ad-
vocacy, voting and political outcomes (ibid., p. ͟͞͠).
Regardless of the inϐluence of individuals on the political outcome, citizens should
see their role as part of a “collective undertaking of determining political outcomes”
(ibid., p. ͟͞͡). Weithman’s argument is that standards of good citizenship that dis-
courage irresponsible political behaviour must answer the concern “what if every-
one did that?”
The relationship between citizens’ actions and a political outcome form the jus-
tiϐicatory basis for Weithman’s conception of responsible citizenship. At the end of
public political debate citizens make a choice that is binding on all. Citizens who en-
gage in debate therefore act as decision makers. They need to justify the outcomes
they favour to the other citizens because they (the others) will be affected by them
(ibid., p. ͦ͟͞f.).
Weithman acknowledges that citizens vote not for laws but for candidates, and
their public debate often revolves around candidates, parties etc. Nevertheless,
Weithmanmaintains, citizens favour candidates and vote for them because they ad-
opt certain standpoints on issues; and because they expect their favoured candid-
ates to see to it that their standpoints are implemented, if elected (ibid., p. ͥ͟͟).
For example, if a citizen supports a candidate who favours a law restricting assisted
suicide, the citizen has a duty to vote or support responsibly because his political
behaviour entails a commitment to a political outcome (the law restricting assisted
suicide) which impinges on citizens’ interests (ibid., p. ͦ͟͟).
Political decision-making also underlies the restrictions Perry proposes as mor-
ally appropriate in public discourse. In discussing possible self-restraint, Perry talks
about legislators and citizensmaking political choices (Perry ͧͧͥ͟, e.g. p. ͥͥ, ͥͦ). He
maintains that
in making a political choice about the morality of human conduct, especially a coercive political
choice, legislators and others should not rely on a religious argument about the requirements
ͤ͡
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of human well-being unless, in their view, a persuasive secular argument reaches the same con-
clusion about those requirements as the religious argument (ibid., p. ͧͥ).
Macedo, too, relates the need for public reason to the exercise of coercive political
power. The point of excluding religious arguments, he claims, “is not speech at all
but the legitimate grounds of coercion” (Macedo ͧͧͣ͟, p. ͥͣ͢).
͡.ͤ.͟ Deϐining coercion
The rough outline of the argument from coercion is clear enough, although the
concept of coercion remains conspicuously undeϐined. Given that the concept is cru-
cial to the rationale, this is worth exploring further. While the public reason literat-
ure does not discuss the concept of coercion in any more detail than that presented
in the previous section, the concept is the focus of extended debate in ethics.͟͟
Oneof the standardaccounts of coercion isRobertNozick’s, developedas early as
ͧͤͧ͟ (reprinted inNozick ͧͧͥ͟, p. ͤ͟f.). Nozick identiϐies six conditions for coercion:
͟. The coercer threatens to do something if the coercee undertakes a certain
action, and the coercee is aware of the threat.
͠. Thismakes the action the coercee hadwanted to undertake substantially less
eligible as a course of action than not performing the action.
͡. The coercer issues the threat with the intention of making the coercee not
perform the action.
͢. The coercee does not perform the action.
ͣ. The threat by the coercer is part of the reasons the coercee has not to perform
the action.
ͤ. The coercee is aware that if he does perform the action the coercer will do
what he threatened to do.
We can speak of coercion, according to Nozick’s deϐinition, where there is an inten-
tional interference with someone’s action, an interference which, moreover, pro-
ceeds via an open attempt to make someone act according to one’s own will. This
distinguishes coercion from other forms of interference, such as violence on the one
hand and manipulation or deception on the other. For an interference to constitute
coercion, there also needs to be a credible threat of consequences by the coercer,
and the threat of consequences needs to play a role in the coercee’s decision not to
perform an action.
Nozick’s deϐinition is not primarily aimed at political coercion but can be applied
͟͟ See, for example, the essays in Pennock and Chapman ͧͥ͟͠.
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to it. This shows that political coercion is not coercion which citizens exert directly
over one another, but is a relationship between citizens and political arrangements
or, more speciϐically, laws. Laws prescribe courses of action (and prohibit courses of
action) and comewith penalties for non-compliance (condition ͟). Thismakes those
courses of action that are prohibited by law substantially less eligible – think of driv-
ing without a seatbelt or committing murder (condition ͠). Clearly the intention of
penalties is to make citizens abide by the law, to act in certain ways and not to doing
certain things (condition ͡). Citizens often do not perform things prohibited by law,
though by no means always (condition ͢).͟͠ The threat of punishment is certainly
among the reasons why people do not commit offences (condition ͣ). And people
know that if they do commit a crime, they are likely to be persecuted and punished
(condition ͤ).
Coercion is a term connoting disapproval. This does not mean that coercion is
alwayswrong, but it doesmean that coercion needs to be justiϐied. This aspect of the
need for a justiϐication is particularly strong in political coercion. This is the aspect
on which the argument from coercion relies. The argument goes that while it is not
wrong for the law to coerce people, it is wrong to do so without giving them reasons
they can reasonably be expected to accept. This reason-giving takes place in public
debate. That is why in public debate, only those reasons should be given that are
accessible to all citizens, for it is the reasons provided in debatewhich form the basis
of the political arrangements.
͡.ͥ Conclusion
In this chapter I have analysed ϐive rationales for the need for a concept of public
reason in public discourse.
The ϐirst, the argument fromconsensus, rests on the idea that consensus can only
be achieved if particularly contentious arguments such as religious arguments are
not used in public discourse. I showed that the exclusion of arguments is neither
necessary nor sufϐicient for consensus. It is not necessary because a consensus on
political arrangements does not require a consensus on reasons. It is not sufϐicient
͟͠ This condition is more relevant to non-political than to political coercion. In non-political uses of
the concept, the success factor of coercion is important (though not uncontroversial) because the
concept is often used retrospectively, that is, it is used to decide questions such as whether or not
someone could have been expected to resist a threat. With political coercion, by contrast, the focus
is on whether it can be justiϐied, that is, on the legitimacy of political coercion. Here the fact that law
is coercive is more important than whether or not citizens actually abide by it.
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because even when excluding religious and other contentious arguments, the realm
of legitimate arguments is still too great to solve contentious issues like abortion.
The second rationale for public reason is the claim that religion is particularly
divisive, sectarian, intransigent, or dangerous. This rationale is not convincing for
four reasons, I argued. First, it concerns religious persons rather than religious ar-
guments. Second, it contrasts sharplywith the idea of self-restraint in public reason:
the latter assumes that religious citizens are able to stand back from their religious
commitments, the former assumes that they are neither willing nor able to do so.
Third, as an empirical argument the claim that religious arguments are particularly
dangerous is unconvincing, while the claim that that religious belief goes hand in
hand with certain undesirable character traits fails to show how public discourse
can be helped by a restraint on arguments. Fourth, as an empirical argument the
claim that religion is particularly divisive, sectarian, intransigent, or dangerous can
ground a pragmatic call for self-restraint but not a principled one.
Third, the argument of the separation of church and state has been offered as a
rationale for self-restraint. I argued that this rationale fails to be convincing because
it cannot show how the institutional principle of separation can lead to a personal
principle of self-restraint.
Fourth, the argument from respect holds that giving each other reasons is a re-
quirement of respect. In itself, this argument cannot provide a convincing rationale
for self-restraint because it cannot showwhy it is not onlymandated to provide reas-
ons, but also to exercise self-restraint.
The ϐifth argument, the argument from coercion, provides a convincing rationale
for self-restraint if it is tied to the fourth, the argument from respect. Laws are co-
ercive and therefore need to be justiϐied. They need to be justiϐied to citizens and
citizens therefore need to understand and accept the reasons for the coercive polit-
ical arrangements to which they are subject. This is a convincing account of how the
coerciveness of political arrangements impacts on the requirements for their jus-
tiϐication. However, theories of public reason go one step further: they posit that
citizens should not use religious arguments in their public discussions because cit-
izens are in some way involved in the exercise of coercion. I turn to that claim in the
next chapter.
ͤͤ
